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The author surveys and discusses recent decisions and legis-
lation touching on all aspects of commercial law. Among the
topics dealt with are decisions arising under various provisions of
the UCC, products liability, negotiable instruments, mortgage
and banking law, and newly enacted consumer and commercial
legislation on both the state and federal levels.
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I. SALE OF GOODS
A. Goods
A contract of sale for a growing orange crop will constitute a
constructive severance of the oranges from realty and a conversion
to goods. As a result, when a default in a mortgage occurs after the
execution of the sales contract, the purchaser of the oranges will be
entitled to them.' The foreclosing mortgagee has no claim to the
oranges under a "rents, issues and profits" clause in the mortgage
because the mortgagee is only entitled to the rents, issues and prof-
its after he takes possession of the property, either through the
consent of the owner or by the appointment of a receiver. The sales
contract constitutes a constructive severance even though it is an
open price contract, no date of performance is specified, no down
payment is made, and it is provided in the contract that the buyer
will take "all the fruit that meets the standards for the use agreed
upon or specified in this contract at the time of picking the fruit."2
The decision was based upon the following criteria: (1) "this type
of sales agreement, with one or more terms left open, is common in
the citrus industry and that greater harm would be done by holding
this contract void for indefiniteness;"' (2) prior case law; and (3)
sections 2-107(2), 2-204, 2-204(3), 2-305, 2-309, 2-702, 2-706, 2-719(2)
of the UCC uphold the decision.
A federal regulation,' adopted under the Perishable Agricul-
tural Commodities Act,5 provides that a broker of commodities "is
not responsible for payment to the seller by the buyer" in the ab-
sence of a specific agreement to the contrary. Hence, when the in-
voices of the seller to the broker and his buyer merely provide that
the broker is "to collect and remit,"' there has been no guarantee
by the broker of payment by the buyer.
1. Bornstein v. Somersom, 341 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
2. Id. at 1048.
3. Id.
4. 7 C.F.R. § 46.28(c) (1977).
5. 7 U.S.C. §§ 499a-499s (1970).
6. C.H. Robinson Co. v. L & M Brokerage Co., 344 So. 2d 894, 895 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977)
(citing 7 C.F.R. § 46.28(c) (1977)).
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A corporate seller, which falsely represents to a buyer of an
aircraft that the seller is an authorized dealer for the manufacturer,
uses the buyer's deposit to pay operating expenses and refuses to
return the money, is not liable for punitive damages because his
conduct was a breach of contract.' Punitive damages may not be
awarded unless the act complained of was a tort which was willfully
committed "or was attended by fraud, malice or gross negligence." 8
The author has no quarrel with the rule stated by the court, but in
light of the analytic dissenting opinion, the majority opinion would
seem to be an overly generous application of the rule.
B. Products Liability
1. JURISDICTION
The mere fact that Volkswagen of America is a wholly owned
subsidiary corporation of the parent company, Volkswagen of Ger-
many, is not a sufficient basis under section 48.181 of the Florida
Statutes (1975) for service of process upon Volkswagen of America
to be binding upon Volkswagen of Germany? There must also be a
showing that Volkswagen of Germany exercised such a degree of
control over its subsidiary that the subsidiary's actions in Florida
were the actions of the parent. Furthermore, the designation of its
American subsidiary as its agent under the National Highway and
Traffic Safety Act'" was not the equivalent of a "business agent"
under section 48.081(1)(d) of the Florida Statutes (1975). Since this
section applies only to business agents residing in Florida, there was
no proof that the subsidiary corporation was residing in Florida even
though it was authorized to do business in this state.
A retail druggist in Georgia sold prescription drugs in that state
to a Florida resident who died allegedly as a result of their mislabel-
ing. Although the language of the long-arm statute, section
48.193(1)(f)(2) of the Florida Statutes (1975), seemingly applied,
the court determined that insufficient contacts existed so that the
druggist was not susceptible to process." Inasmuch as he neither
sold nor solicited the sale of the drugs in Florida, thus invoking the
protection of Florida law, fundamental ideas of fairness would be
violated if the druggist were forced into Florida courts.
7. Charter Air Cent., Inc. v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
8. Id. at 616.
9. Volkswagenwerk Atkiengelselischaft v. McCurdy, 340 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976),
cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 1977).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1399(e) (1970).
11. Dunn v. Upjohn Co., 350 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
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2. WARRANTY AND TORT LIABILITY
In a unique case, a Florida district court held that although a
retail seller of books may give an implied warranty as to the physical
properties of his books (such as bindings, etc.), he does not give a
UCC or common law warranty that the thoughts contained therein
are of merchantable quality. 2 As a result, a retail seller of a cook-
book would not be liable to a buyer for her injuries and damages
incurred because of the lack of adequate warnings concerning the
poisonous ingredients (a poison plant) used in a recipe. The court
expressly noted, however, that it was not deciding the liability of the
author or publisher. The court also suggested that the retail seller
would of course be liable if he knew that there was a reason to warn
the public about the information in the book and subsequently
failed to do so.
A buyer of an antique car kit, who sues the seller for its failure
to deliver a full and complete kit, is not entitled necessarily to
recover the full contract price upon the entry of a default judgment
against the seller since the seller is entitled to introduce evidence
in mitigation of damages." The court failed to mention that this
case was controlled by the UCC.
When a car manufacturer and its dealer are joined as defen-
dants in a products liability case, and the trial court finds that the
dealer was passively negligent while the manufacturer was actively
negligent, the dealer is entitled to indemnification from the manu-
facturer for the amount of the plaintiff's judgment plus the dealer's
reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 4 The dealer is not to be denied
attorney's fees and costs merely because the original plaintiff alleges
active negligence by the dealer when the dealer is found (or admit-
ted to be) not guilty of active negligence.
If a jury verdict is in accord with the experts' conclusions that
the cause of a truck accident was a design defect in a nut which
controlled the steering mechanism rather than a fracture which de-
veloped as a result of the crash, an appellate court should not over-
turn the verdict. 5
In a products liability suit, it is proper to allow the introduction
of evidence of prior accidents involving the product "where it was
12. Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977). See also Haralampopoulos v.
Capital News Agency, Inc., 70 Ill. App. 2d 17, 217 N.E.2d 366 (1966).
13. Bay Products Corp. v. Winters, 341 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
14. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. King, 340 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).




shown to have been a reasonably similar occurrence under similar
circumstances."I
Although a manufacturer's recall letter for defects in its prod-
ucts may not be admissible for the purpose of showing that a defect
existed in a particular product (a motorcycle) at issue in a trial, the
letter is admissible "to show that the defect existed in the hands of
the manufacturer."'
7
The doctrine of strict liability in tort, which was adopted in
West v. Caterpillar Tractor Company, Inc.," cannot be applied in
a case in which the trial has already begun or been completed and
the doctrine had not been "appropriately and properly raised during
some stage of the litigation."'"
A rash of cases has arisen involving the potential liability of
companies marketing burglar alarm systems. Where a burglary oc-
curs and the system manifests a "trouble signal" (not an alarm)
when telephone wires were cut by burglars and the alarm company's
employees notified the telephone company instead of the police or
the customer in accordance with the company's policy, the company
may be held liable.2 0 The court held that whether this practice is
negligent is a jury question. The court rejected the view expressed
in many cases that the burglary is an intervening, unforeseen cause
which would bar recovery against the alarm company. The court
found that the criminal act is sufficiently foreseeable."
Along similar lines, a burglar alarm installation company
which fails to wire all of the windows in a home as called for by its
contract may be held liable in negligence and breach of warranty
in the event that burglars make use of the unwired windows to break
into the home."
The limitation period on a written warranty, not under seal, is
five years under section 95.11(3) of the Florida Statutes (1973). It
should be noted that section 95.11 has eliminated the seal as having
any effect upon the limitation periods.
Section 762.2-316(5) of the Florida version of the UCC provides
that the distribution or use of whole blood, plasma, etc., is a service
16. Warn Indus, v. Geist, 343 So. 2d 44, 46 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
17. Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Carpenter, 350 So. 2d 360, 361 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
18. 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
19. Linder v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 342 So. 2d 474, 476 (Fla. 1977). The court also
articulated a series of rules as to the application of the West doctrine in a variety of cases in
differing stages of prosecution.
20. Nicholas v. Miami Burglar Alarm Co., 339 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1976), approving in part
and disapproving in part, 297 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
21. Singer v. I.A. Durbin, Inc., 348 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
22. Fenner v. Florentine Forge, Inc., 342 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
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and not a sale, and, consequently, there are no warranties of mer-
chantability or of fitness for a particular purpose. This statute has
been held applicable to a transaction where the blood was furnished
prior to the effective date of the statute, but the illness (serum
hepatitis) was not discovered until after the effective date and suit
was not instituted until three years after the discovery.
23
A developer-builder who fails to sound-proof party walls in a
condominium, in accordance with specifications filed with the ap-
propriate city's building department, will be liable to a purchaser
for breach of implied warranties of fitness and merchantability. 2
3. DEFENSES TO LIABILITY
Under the decision in Blackburn v. Dorta,25 assumption of the
risk in Florida has been merged into the comparative negligence
doctrine and is no longer an absolute defense. A district court, how-
ever, may have resurrected the assumption of the risk defense under
the name of "causation." 6 A packing house worker was warned
about the dangers of a rotating sampler arm in a sampling machine
used in the fruit trade. The employee was supposed to work between
ten and twenty feet from the rotating sampler arm. For an undis-
closed reason, the employee crawled underneath the machine and
the rotating sampler arm crushed his head, killing him. The court
held that the death of the employee was caused solely by his own
action and was not contributed to by any defect in the machine; the
employee disregarded the warnings of his supervisor to stay away
from the machine "which presented obvious dangers during opera-
tion."
27
This case should be compared with Blaw-Knox Food & Chemi-
cal Equipment Corp. v. Holmes,"5 decided by the District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, in which it was held that the patent danger
doctrine in product liability cases (i.e., the defense of a
manufacturer-seller that the dangerous defect in the goods was ob-
vious to the plaintiff and he should be barred from recovery) has
been merged into the defense of contributory negligence and the
principles of comparative negligence with the result that the jury
may now apportion the negligence of the user in light of the patent
danger in the product.
23. Lewis v. Associated Medical Inst., Inc., 345 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
24. David v. B. & J. Holding Corp., 349 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
25. 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977).
26. Watson v. Lucerne Mach. & Equip., Inc., 347 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
27. Id. at 461.
28. 348 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
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In Dayton Tire and Rubber Company v. Davis,29 a divided dis-
trict court considered the application of the neligence doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur to a products liability case. Testimony on the plain-
tiff's behalf indicated that the cause of the tire blowout, which was
the basis of the suit, was of such a nature that it could only have
happened within the control of the defendant. Defendant's expert
disagreed, however, and testified that the blowout was the result of
improper use of the tire. The court ruled that in a situation of
conflicting testimony such as this the res ipsa loquitur instruction
should properly be given, and that it is within the province of the
jury to decide whether a defect was created while the tire was under
the defendant's exclusive control.
C. Legislation
Section 319.21(2) of the Florida Statutes (1975) was amended
to provide that a manufacturer's statement of origin for a motor
vehicle may not be issued or reissued to any distributor, dealer, or
person for the purpose of updating any motor vehicle that is for
sale." Updating was defined as a modification of the motor vehicle
so that it resembles a current year model, or the replacement of the
original identification number and chassis number so as to reflect a
change in the year of manufacture, "or any other modification
which misrepresents the actual year manufactured, or issuing an-




It is now an unlawful trust and an unlawful restraint of trade
for any person who is chartered by or authorized to do business in
Florida to grant or accept any letter of credit or other document
which evidences the transfer of funds or credit or to enter into any
contract for the exchange or purchase of commodities where the
letter of credit, contract, or other document requires a party to
discriminate against or to certify that it has not dealt or will not deal
with any other person on the basis of sex, race, color, religion, ances-
try or national origin, or on the basis of a person's lawful business
associations.32 It is also unlawful to refuse to grant or to accept any
of the foregoing instruments on the grounds that they do not contain
a discriminatory certification in order to comply with a foreign boy-
cott. It is similarly illegal to request or to furnish information with
regard to a person's religion, race, sex, ethnic or national origin or
29. 348 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
30. 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 77-11 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 319.21(2) (1977)).
31. Id.
32. Id. ch. 77-9 (creating FLA. STAT. § 542.13 (1977)).
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presence or absence on a blacklist for the use of a foreign country."
Chapter 320 of the Florida Statutes which deals with motor
vehicles was extensively amended to provide that the sale of new
recreational vehicles (such as travel trailers, motor homes, truck
campers, etc.) must have the same warranties as those required in
mobile homes sales.
34
II. WAREHOUSING AND TRANSPORTATION OF GOODS
A bill of lading requirement that the shipper must give a writ-
ten claim of loss within nine months of the loss may be satisfied by
a letter which identifies the shipments by invoice numbers and
additional letters which complain about missing and damaged
goods so that the carrier has sufficient written notice of the losses
the shipper intends to claim. Furthermore, although the shipper did
not pay all of the shipping charges prior to the filing of the suit as
required by the carrier's tariff, he is not prevented from suing as the
shipping charges and the damage claims can be adjudicated to-
gether in the suit.
35
A federally regulated air freight forwarder's tariff, which re-
quired the filing of a suit for damages within one year after the
disallowance of a claim by the company, is effective to bar suits filed
after the specified time.36 The argument that the Florida statute of
limitations, which allows a longer period, ought to apply was re-
jected because the tariff was filed in accord with federal regulations
which normally preempt state statutes in the interstate aviation
field.
Section 7-204(2) of the UCC, which permits a warehouse to
limit its liability for bailed goods to an amount stipulated on the
warehouse receipt, has been upheld by a Florida court and con-
strued not to require the limitation of liability language to be in
conspicuous print7.3 Unfortunately, the same court seemed to indi-
cate that when goods disappear from the warehouse and the ware-
house admits its negligence, then the liability of the warehouse is
limited in accordance with its limitation clause. It is submitted that
in unexplained disappearance cases, the rule is that the warehouse
should be held liable for conversion for misdelivery and liable for the
full value. Under the holding of this case, warehousemen are encour-
33. Id.
34. Id. ch. 77-357, § 42 (amending FLA. STAT. § 320.835 (1975)).
35. Vogue Optical Mfg. Co. v. National Van Lines, Inc., 339 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1976).
36. Life Sciences, Inc. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 341 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
37. Sanfisket, Inc. v. Atlantic Cold Storage Corp., 347 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
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aged to sell bailed goods, claim that the goods disappeared through
their own negligence, and then pay at the reduced rate.
A transportation insurance policy, providing for coverage from
the time that the insured seller's goods leave his store in Miami
until they are delivered to their destination (Japan) and "while the
property is in due course of transit in the custody of a common
carrier incidental to transportation," does not cover a two week
period during which the goods are lying on a dock in Jacksonville,
Florida (in a container) while the seller attempts to find a new buyer
after the collapse of the original sale.3" The court did not consider
the goods to be in transit while they were on the dock awaiting the
seller's decision to send them to another destination.
A carrier under Public Service Commission (PSC) jurisdiction
may not enter into a special contract with a shipper for a rate less
than PSC authorized rates. It may enter into a valid oral contract
with a shipper to supply a sufficient number of tank cars so as to
give the shipper the opportunity of shipping at the authorized rate
of twenty-seven cents per 100 pounds when shipments exceed 12,000
tons per year rather than the authorized rate of forty-eight cents per
100 pounds when shipments are less than 12,000 tons per year. If the
carrier fails to supply the agreed upon tank cars in sufficient num-
ber, it will be liable for the amount the shipper must spend to pay
for trucking the goods, and the carrier will not be permitted to
collect the higher rate per 100 pounds from the shipper. 9
III. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
A. Jurisdiction
Section 48.193(1)(g) of the Florida Statutes (1975) provides for
long-arm jurisdiction over any person "breaching a contract in this
state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be per-
formed in this state." This statute has been interpreted to mean
that a nonresident who signs a promissory note in this state is sub-
ject to jurisdiction here on the basis that his failure to pay consti-
tutes a breach.4"
B. Agency
Under section 3-403(2)(b) of the UCC, a corporate officer who
signs corporate checks without indicating his agency status (such as
38. Allied Leisure Indus., Inc. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 342 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1977).
39. Florida E. Coast Ry. v. Sheffield, 349 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
40. First Nat'l Bank v. Dunham, 342 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
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"treasurer," etc.) will be personally obligated on the check to a
payee unless he is able to prove that it was the intention of the
parties that he act in a representative capacity when signing the
check. This intention may be difficult to prove when the corporation
is insolvent and the payee-holder knows that he will never collect if
the corporate officer prevails.4 '
Under this same section of the UCC, a maker of a promissory
note who merely writes the word "by" before his name may not
introduce parol testimony that he was signing in a representative
capacity on behalf of a corporation." Although this section does
provide that the maker may introduce parol evidence against imme-
diate parties when the instrument "does not name the person repre-
sented but does show that the person signed in a representative
capacity," the court was of the view that the word "by" alone would
not indicate that he signed in a representative capacity.
C. Foreign Corporations
An officer of a foreign corporation who signed corporate checks
cannot be held personally responsible for the debts of the corpora-
tion incurred in a commercial transaction in Florida simply because
the corporation had failed to secure permission to do business in this
state. 3
D. Parol Testimony
Although parol testimony is admissible to show a lack or a
failure of consideration when a maker of a note is sued by the payee,
parol testimony may not be introduced to show: (1) that the maker-
guarantors and the payee-bank were involved in an oral joint ven-
ture; (2) that the bank would receive only profits from the venture
and not the payments called for by the note; and (3) that the note
was only a sham for the purpose of "regularizing" the transaction
between the makers, guarantors and the payee of the note."
E. Defenses
A wife who cosigns a promissory note with her husband because
of the implied threats of the payee to have her husband imprisoned
for converting funds of the payee may not, after her husband's
41. Medley Harwoods, Inc. v. Novy, 346 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
42. Giacalone v. Bernstein, 348 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
43. Medley Harwoods, Inc. v. Novy, 346 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).




death, successfully assert the legal defense of duress in the absence
of proof that the payee's threats were illegal or wrongful.
45
It is reversible error to enter a judgment on the pleadings in
favor of a payee-plaintiff on a promissory note when the maker has
set up the defense of duress even though this affirmative defense
was mistakenly stated in a counterclaim rather than in an answer.
This defense can be considered as if it had been properly set forth
in the answer as an affirmative defense.46
In a suit on a promissory note, the court may enter summary
judgment in favor of the payee when the alleged makers, in their
answer, merely deny all allegations of the complaint without specifi-
cally denying their signatures .4 Section 3-307(1) of the UCC pro-
vides that "unless specifically denied in the pleadings each signa-
ture on an instrument is admitted."
Fraud may be asserted as a defense by the maker against the
payee of a negotiable note. 48 It should be noted, however, that in
certain cases payees may be holders in due course 4' and will take free
of certain kinds of fraud committed by third parties. 0
A default judgment entered in favor of a payee on a promissory
note is res judicata as to liability and as to the total amount ad-
judged to be owing by the maker. This judgment is not res judicata
in a subsequent suit by the maker against the payee for breach of
contract for which the notes were payment, because this latter suit
involves issues which were not involved in the prior default judg-
ment.5'
F. Forgery
In the absence of express authority from the client, an attorney
has no power to settle a client's case without the client's knowledge
and consent, nor has he the power to cash the settlement check
without the client's consent. The settlement is a nullity, and the
insurance company (with whom the attorney "settled") remains
liable to the client.2 It should be noted that an opposite view has
been taken by the highest courts in New York53 and California.5 4
45. Norris v. Stewart, 350 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
46. American Housing Sys. Corp. v. Country Club of Miami Corp., 342 So. 2d 1026 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1977).
47. Lipton v. Southeast First Nat'l Bank, 343 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
48. Poneleit v. Reksmad, Inc., 346 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
49. U.C.C. § 3-302(2) & Comment 2 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 673.302(2) (1977)).
50. Id. § 3-305(2)(c) & Comment 7 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 673.305(2)(c) (1977)).
51. Perez v. Rodriguez, 349 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
52. Nehleber v. Anzalone, 345 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
53. Hutzler v. Hertz Corp., 39 N.Y.2d 209, 347 N.E.2d 627, 383 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1976).
54. Navrides v. Zurich Ins. Co., 5 Cal. 3d 698, 488 P.2d 637, 97 Cal. Rpt'r. 309 (1971).
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G. Stopping Payment
In a case void of facts, a district court held that there was no
evidence to support the award of punitive damages for stopping
payment of a check. On the other hand, the trial court was in error
for failing to tax interest on the amount of the check from its date
to the date of final judgment."
H. Legislation
Section 673.122(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes (1975) (U.C.C. §
3-122(1)(b)) has been amended to provide that the cause of action
against a maker or acceptor on demand instruments (other than
demand notes), shall accrue upon their date, or if they are not dated
on the date of issue.5" In the case of demand notes, the cause of
action accrues against the maker and any endorsers, guarantors or
other persons secondarily liable under revised section 95.031 of the
Florida Statutes (1975) upon the first written demand for payment.
Under an amendment to chapter 697 of the Florida Statutes
(1975), "[a]ny note which is silent as to the right of the obligor to
prepay the note in advance of the stated maturity date may be
prepaid in full by the obligor or his successor in interest without
penalty."57 This amendment is troublesome for several reasons: (a)
if it is meant to govern every note, then the amendment should have
been made to Article 3 of the UCC in, for example, sections 673.109,
673.112, or 673.118 of the Florida Statutes (1975); (b) because it is
located in chapter 697 it might be deemed to govern only those notes
secured by mortgages, leaving unsecured notes outside of its scope;
and (c) there is no mention as to whether or not it is intended to
cover existing notes.
Section 4-106 of the Florida UCC (section 674.106 of the Florida
Statutes (1975)) has been amended to provide that the receipt of
any notice or order by, or the knowledge of, one branch or separate
office of a bank is not actual or constructive notice to or knowledge
of any other branch or separate office of the same bank. This does
not impair the right of such other branch or separate office to be a
holder in due course of an item. For the purpose of this section, a
separate drive-in and walkup facility of the bank may be operated
within one mile of the main office and still be considered as a sepa-
rate office.58
55. Fort Pierce Toyota, Inc. v. Wolf, 345 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
56. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-54.
57. Id. ch. 77-318 (adding FLA. STAT. § 697.06 (1977)).
58. Id. ch. 77-384 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 659.06 & 674.106 (1975)).
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IV. SURETIES AND GUARANTORS
Although service of process is not made upon a guarantor of a
mortgage note, if he should enter into an agreement with the mort-
gagee to stay the proceedings and to make changes in the mortgage,
he has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. 5
An accommodation party who signs a note which provides that
"all endorsers and sureties agree that this note may in whole or in
part be extended or renewed after maturity from time to time with-
out notice to them and without release of their liability hereon" will
not be discharged from liability under section 3-606(1) of the UCC
in the event the maker extends the time of payment." In this case,
the parties agreed to more than one extension as allowed in section
3-118(f), which states that "unless otherwise specified" consent to
extension authorizes a single extension for not longer than the origi-
nal period.
A co-owner of a corporation who enters into a continuing guar-
anty agreement with a supplier of goods to ensure payment for goods
supplied is not relieved from his agreement simply by selling his
corporate interest to his fellow co-owner, informing the supplier of
the change of ownership and furnishing the supplier an additional
guaranty agreement from the remaining owner." The guaranty
agreement had provided specifically for termination by written no-
tice sent by the guarantor to the supplier, which was not followed.
As a result, the estate of the guarantor remained liable for goods sold
to the corporation.
Normally, the extension of a loan agreement between the prin-
cipal debtor and the creditor will discharge any accommodation
parties (sureties) on the note. If, however, the accommodation par-
ites consent to the extension, they will not be discharged and their
consent can be established by parol testimony showing that they,
as officers of the principal debtor, requested the extension.2
When a promissory demand note payable in one year provides
that the signers, including accommodation parties, agree to any
extensions or renewals of the note without notice which would be
binding upon all parties, the holder may enter into a stipulation
during the pendency of a lawsuit on the note that the note will be
converted from a demand instrument to a time instrument which
59. First Wis. Nat'l Bank v. Donian, 343 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
60. Bay Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Mason, 349 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977). Section
3-606(1) expressly provides that accommodation parties will not be discharged in the event
of an extension of payment when the parties have so agreed.
61. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. CHB Farms, Inc., 340 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
62. Vanguard Constr. Co. v. Lewis State Bank, 348 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
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will come within the extension clause and will not be deemed to be
a novation discharging any accommodation parties. "3 At the time
that this stipulation was entered into, the accommodation parties
could have paid the instrument and would then have had immedi-
ate recourse against the accommodated party; thus, they have not
been harmed by the result.
V. MORTGAGES
A. Documentary Stamps
When a corporation purchases real property with its own funds,
binds itself with a purchase-money mortgage and makes all pay-
ments on a mortgage for the construction of warehouses thereon
held by the title holder-sole stockholder, then a conveyance of the
title of the property to the corporation without actual payment of
consideration is exempt from documentary stamp taxes pursuant to
section 201.02 of the Florida Statutes and chapter 12A-4.14 of the
Florida Administrative Code.1
4
Under section 201.02, when the property is conveyed to a gran-
tee subject to a mortgage or when the grantee agrees to assume the
mortgage, documentary stamp taxes are due on the full sales price
on the theory that the grantee has given consideration to the extent
of the balance of the mortgage. However, if the grantee under a quit-
claim deed is already bound to pay the mortgage under an indem-
nity agreement, he is not liable for an additional tax because only
the form of the grantee's liability has changed. 5
B. Execution of Mortgages
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, held that two
witnesses are no longer required to the execution of a mortgage on
homestead property because the phrase "duly executed" had been
omitted from article X, section 4(c) of the present constitution.
Prior cases had used this phrase as the reason for requiring two
witnesses."
Apparently a simple letter written by a client to his attorney
may act as a lien on certain real property when the letter acknowl-
edges that the client owes the attorney a sum of money for legal
services." The letter may be recorded and constitute a lien on the
63. Taines v. Capital City First Nat'l Bank, 344 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
64. American Foam Indus., Inc. v. Department of Fin. 345 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
65. Abramson v. Straughn, 348 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
66. Wickes Corp. v. Moxley, 342 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
67. Mason v. Antonacci, 342 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
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property entitling the attorney to recover, provided he proves that
the legal services were in fact performed. Furthermore, this recorded
letter entitles the attorney to priority over a subsequently recorded
federal tax lien filed against the client.
C. Balloon Mortgages
When attorneys for a mortgagor and mortgagee have negotiated
the final terms of a promissory note (secured by a mortgage) and
the attorney for the mortgagee prepared the final draft, the closing
was at his office and both parties had knowledge of the contents of
the instrument, the mortgagor is not estopped from pleading that
the note and mortgage constituted a balloon mortgage (as forbidden
by section 697.05 of the Florida Statutes) and subject to forfeiture
of all interest and attorney's fees. 8 If both parties are deemed to
have full knowledge of the facts, then neither party can be deemed
to have relied upon the other and there cannot be any estoppel. In
the course of the decision, the court pleaded with the legislature to
ameliorate the harsh provisions of the statute."
The District Court of Appeal for the Fourth District held that
the sanctions of the Balloon Mortgage Act may not be evaded by
the mortgagee electing to sue on the note rather than attempting to
foreclose the mortgage. Although the ultimate holding appears to be
correct, the court seemed to have assumed that section 9-501(1) of
the UCC has some application to a mortgage of land but then de-
cided that the Balloon Mortgage Act controlled the case rather than
section 9-501(1).70 Section 9-501(1) of the UCC has no application
to a real estate mortgage; it is confined to security interests in goods,
etc. The court reached the correct result, but for the wrong reason.
The balloon mortgage statute provides for an exemption when
the mortgage is created for a term of more than five years. This
clause has been interpreted to mean that the five year period begins
to run from the date of execution and delivery of the mortgage and
not from the time over which the payments are to be made. Conse-
quently, if the last payment is more than five years after the execu-
tion date, the mortgage is saved from the sanctions of the statute.71
The balloon mortgage statute also states that if a mortgage
provides for periodic payments of interest only with one final pay-
ment of the entire principal, it is excepted from the requirements
of the statute. A mortgage which provides for periodic payments of
68. Overstreet v. Bishop, 343 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
69. Id. at 960-61.
70. Slomovic v. Petryk, 341 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
71. Perry v. Key W. State Bank, 339 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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interest only, but with principal payments of $100 to become paya-
ble monthly in the event that the gross income from the encumbered
property should exceed $15,000 for the preceding year, is within the
exception and thus exempt from the statute.72
D. Interpretation of Mortgages
A release clause, contained in a letter sent to the mortgagors the
day before they signed the mortgage, falls within the rule that where
other instruments are executed contemporaneously with a mortgage
and as part of the same transaction, all of the documents are to be
read together in order to determine the intent of the parties. Fur-
thermore, if the mortgagors tender payment under the release
clause, it will be effective after a foreclosure suit is filed because the
release clause is a vested right which may be exercised at any time
until a decree of foreclosure is entered. 73
E. Merger
When mortgagors convey encumbered property to the mortga-
gee, this may constitute a merger with the result that the mortgage
no longer exists. In the absence of an accord and satisfaction agree-
ment, however, this conveyance does not satisfy the promissory note
which was secured by the mortgage, and the holder of the note (the
mortgagee) may sue and recover the unpaid balance. 4
When the mortgagor conveys mortgaged property back to the
mortgagee, the mortgage is extinguished through the doctrine of
merger. When, however, a judgment lien has been fastened upon the
property after the execution of the mortgage and the lien creditor
now claims that he is the senior creditor because the original mort-
gage has been extinguished, it is a question of the mortgagee's inten-
tion as to whether he intended this merger to occur. Furthermore,
there is a rebuttable presumption that the mortgagee would not
intend for a merger to result in subjecting his property to a lien
having priority over his own mortgage.75
F. Construction Loans and Future Advances
Section 697.04 of the Florida Statutes (1975) provides that
mortgages "may, and when so expressed therein shall, secure not
only existing indebtedness, but also such future advances. . . " In
72. Davies v. Cox, 349 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
73. Boyette v. Carden, 347 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
74. Morton v. Rifai, 339 So. 2d 707, 708 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
75. Gourley v. Wollam, 348 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
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a case of first impression, it was held that in light of the common
law, it is not necessary for a construction mortgage to recite that it
is to secure future advances in order for it to have priority over
mechanic lien claimants whose rights intervene between the record-
ing of the mortgage and the making of future advances." This is
particularly so when the mechanic lien claimant is a contractor who
knew of the purpose of the construction mortgage and received dis-
bursements from it.
It is no defense to a foreclosure action that the lender had
allegedly agreed to fund a building project until its completion when
it is shown that the lender did advance additional sums in order that
the amount would be sufficient to complete construction. The
lender, therefore, is not bound to advance further sums when the
first advance is insufficient because of cost overruns."
In Dunson v. Stockton, Whatley, Davin & Co.," the owners of
land, pursuant to a contract, deeded the property to their building
contractor in order to enable him to borrow construction money
from a lender. The contractor, in turn, mortgaged the property to
the lender. The mortgage contained a future advance clause and the
lender was forced to lend more than the original contract price in
order to complete the home. During the course of construction, the
lender took effective control of the contractor in order to complete
the work. The lender then sued to foreclose the mortgage for the
originally agreed amount plus the subsequent advances. The origi-
nal owners of the land contended that since the lender knew of their
arrangement with the contractor, he could not claim to be a bona
fide lender, and therefore it was subject to its terms. The court held,
however, that the owners, by conveying to the contractor, were es-
topped from asserting anything in derogation of the deed. Neverthe-
less, at the moment the lender took effective control of the contrac-
tor, an equitable lien came into force for the benefit of the original
owners to which the mortgage was subordinate. Any advances made
after that date were subordinate to the construction contract with
the apparent result (upon remand of the case) that the owners
would not be liable for the amounts advanced after the date of the
takeover of the contractor by the lender.
An appellate court in Florida declined to hold that a contractor,
who has been forced to incur legal expenses in defending himself
from the claims and suits brought by subcontractors as the result
76. Snead Constr. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 342 So. 2d 517, 519-20 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1977).
77. Walter Harvey Corp. v. O'Keefe, 346 So. 2d 617, 618 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
78. 346 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
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of a failure of a lender to disburse loan funds, has a cause of action
for these legal expenses against the lender. 9 The court was of the
view that an affirmative decision "might have the effect of promot-
ing a multitude of commercial litigation ..
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that an offi-
cer of a construction lender may assure suppliers of labor and mate-
rials that there are sufficient funds to complete the condominium
project, that there is no need to file mechanic's liens and that the
officer would do everything in his power to see that they were paid
without constituting a waiver of priority by the lender-bank against
these claimants. 80 This conclusion was reached because of the trial
court's finding that these statements were neither fraudulent nor
untrue, and that no misrepresentations had been directed towards
the claimants. In addition to inconsistent statements throughout
the opinion, it does not appear to be in accord with those decided
in other districts.
If a supplier of materials to a building site is in privity with the
contractor but not with the bank financing the construction, the
supplier is not entitled to an equitable lien superior to the bank's
construction loan mortgage in the absence of some material misre-
presentation, fraud, mistake or some fact showing that the bank
affirmatively deceived the supplier in order to induce it to supply
materials.8'
When mortgages are perfected within one year after a notice of
commencement has been filed under the Mechanic's Lien Act and
they are then assigned more than one year after the filing of the
notice of commencement, the assignees take subject to the recorded
notice. 2 Two separate grounds exist for this result: (1) that as mort-
gagees they do not have an interest in real property (under section
713.13 of the Florida Statutes (1975)); or (2) that as assignees they
step into the shoes of their assignor with the same rights and duties.
A construction loan mortgagee who records his mortgage before
any materialman supplies materials to the building site has priority
over any liens asserted by these materialmen.5 3
Under sections 713.21 and 713.22 of the Florida Statutes (1971),
a mechanic's lien must be enforced within one year from the date
79. Norin Mtg. Corp. v. Wasco, Inc., 343 So. 2d 940, 942 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
80. Palmer First Nat'l Bank v. Rinker Materials Corp., 348 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1977).
81. Gancedo Lumber Co. v. Flagship First Nat'l Bank, 340 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1976).
82. United of Fla., Inc. v. Illinois Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 341 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1977); accord, Southern Colonial Mtg. Co. v. Medeiros, 347 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
83. Security Life Ins. Co. v. Travis, 340 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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of filing. If a mechanic's lien claimant should bring a suit to enforce
the lien against the mortgagee within one year of filing the lien but
should fail to make the fee holder a party to the action, the lien will
die after the expiration of the one year period and will be invalid
against the mortgagee. 4
A mortgagee has a cause of action against a judgment lien
creditor who wrongfully destroys a part of the mortgaged property
in the process of levying the writ of execution. 5
When a purchase-money lender in the financing of the purchase
of individual condominium units pays money to the construction
lender of the entire project (whose lien predated mechanic's lien
claimants), his lien becomes subrogated to the first lien of the con-
struction lender but will have priority over the mechanic's lien
claimants. 8 This is true even though no formal assignment of mort-
gage is made by the construction lender to the purchase-money
lender.
G. Acceleration
An agreement for deed (treated as a mortgage in Florida) which
does not provide for acceleration -of the balance owing upon the
default of the vendee may not be accelerated by the vendor. The
vendor may foreclose upon default of the vendee, and the property
may be sold to satisfy the amount then due, with the sale subject
to payment by the purchaser of the remaining balance of the agree-
ment. 7
H. Defenses
A mortgagee who receives a check drawn on an account of a
stranger to the mortgage, upon condition that the mortgagee extend
the mortgage, cannot keep the check after refusing to comply with
the condition. 8
A mortgagor's alleged easement (of ingress and egress to adja-
cent lands) on mortgaged land is not a sufficient affirmative defense
to a foreclosure action because the easement could only be effective
if the mortgage were foreclosed. In the event of foreclosure, it would
be possible to adjudicate the issue of the existence of the easement
in the suit.8
84. Diversified Mtg. Inv. v. Benjamin, 345 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
85. Moseley v. Bi-Lo Supermarket, Inc., 341 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
86. Southern Colonial Mtg. Co. v. Medeiros, 347 So. 2d 736, 738-39 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
87. Adkinson v. Nyberg, 344 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
88. Southeast First Nat'l Bank v. Taines, 339 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
89. Tower Estates, Inc. v. Slewett, 346 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
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A court may, of course, refuse to enforce a mortgage by foreclo-
sure when it finds that the mortgagors have proved by a preponder-
ance of evidence that the mortgage was without consideration and
that the mortgagees had unclean hands. 0
I. Usury
It would appear that when lenders have exacted usurious inter-
est and then perjured themselves at one stage in the court proceed-
ings regarding the amount of money actually lent to the borrowers,
the court may enter a judgment in favor of the lenders for the
amount actually lent, deny any interest, refuse foreclosure of the
mortgage, and then cancel the mortgage.'
The fact that a lender has received more money (allegedly in-
terest) than is permitted by law does not prove the exaction of
usurious interest. Usurious intent must be shown; if there is a genu-
ine question as to this intent, a summary judgment should not be
entered in favor of the borrower.2 In addition, attorney's fees are not
authorized to be awarded to a successful borrower under section
687.04 of the Florida Statutes (1975).
A claim by a lender for interest over fifteen percent per annum
is not usurious when the loan agreement, as construed by the court,
does not provide for over fifteen percent interest. 3
The mortgagor's bare allegations that a mortgage was usurious
is not sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment when
his affidavit contained no calculations (as requested by the trial
court) to support them. 4
If a foreign state or territory has a real and vital connection with
a construction loan transaction encumbering land in Florida so as
to permit the disbursement of the loan in the foreign territory rather
than in Florida, and the contract calls for the application of the law
of the foreign territory, then the loan may be upheld over the con-
tention that it would be usurious under the law of Florida. However,
if the facts show that the transaction was arranged so as to evade
Florida law and, therefore, was in bad faith, Florida law would
control.
In a mortgage foreclosure action, a mortgagor who counter-
claims for the forfeiture of usurious interest under section 687.04 of
90. Pelle v. Glantz, 349 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
91. Wasman v. Rubinson, 341 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
92. Wells v. Freedman, 342 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
93. McTigue v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 344 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
94. Eastland Inv. Co. v. Baker, 344 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
95. Bella Isla Constr. Corp. v. Trust Mtg. Corp., 347 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
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the Florida Statutes (1975) is, in reality, claiming damages and is,
therefore, entitled to a jury trial on this issue if he requests it."
J. Foreclosure
A trial court does not have the power to dismiss the counter-
claim of a mortgagor in a mortgage foreclosure suit unless the mort-
gagor posts in the registry of the court (or in a comparable alterna-
tive method) the amount claimed due on the mortgage by the mort-
gagee plus delinquent interest and taxes. 7 This would be an uncon-
stitutional deprivation of the mortgagor's right to free access to the
courts."
In a mortgage foreclosure action, the trial court may try equita-
ble issues without a jury and then empanel a jury to hear law issues
raised by the mortgagor." The mortgagor is not entitled to a jury
trial of all issues, both legal and equitable.
A trial court should not dismiss a construction mortgagor's de-
fenses to a construction mortgagee's foreclosure action as a sham
unless the defenses are plainly fictitious. The trial court is not au-
thorized to weigh issues and resolve conflicts in order to dismiss
defenses as sham.1°0
When a foreclosing mortgagee fails to show by the slightest
evidence that its mortgage is superior to the interest claimed by a
party who filed an answer stating that the latter was without knowl-
edge of the mortgagee's allegations, the mortgagee is not entitled to
summary judgment against this party."1 The burden of proof was
on the plaintiff-mortgagee; the foreclosed party need make no show-
ing.
A foreclosure sale will not be set aside when it is shown that the
successful bidder, the City of Miami, had one announced agent
bidder who bid and then withdrew from the sale while an unan-
nounced agent made the successful bid apparently in his own right
and then tendered a City of Miami check in payment, in the ab-
sence of proof that this "highly suspicious"'' 2 conduct depressed the
price or restrained the bidding.
The fee simple owner of realty is an indispensable party to a
foreclosure action by a mortgagee. When there are a number of
96. Smith v. Barnett Bank, 350 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
97. G.B.B. Inv., Inc. v. Hinterkopf, 343 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
98. Id. at 901.
99. Penmont Enterprises, Inc. v. Dysart, 340 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
100. Reif Dev., Inc. v. Wachovia Mtg. Co., 340 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
101. Hamilton v. Bank of Palm Beach & Trust Co., 348 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
102. Devanzo v. Resolute Ins. Co., 345 So. 2d 365, 366 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977) (Hubbart, J.,
concurring).
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mortgages, the court has no power to adjudicate priorities as to a
mortgagee who filed no pleadings, took no part in the hearings, and
apparently (the decision is not clear on this point) was not joined
as a party defendant. 03
The trustees of a business trust founded under the law of Cali-
fornia, but qualified in Florida, may not maintain a suit on a note
and mortgage in Florida on behalf of the trust. The trust which has
been granted permission to do business in Florida must be joined
as a party plaintiff. 04
In a case of apparent first impression in Florida, it was held
that when a mortgage with a balance of $1,988,061.25 has been
foreclosed and the mortgagee bids in $1,000 at the foreclosure sale,
the mortgagor could not redeem by paying only $1,000, but instead
had to pay the entire unpaid amount. 05
Under sections 95.11(2)(c) and 95.281 of the Florida Statutes
(1975), when a mortgage does not contain an acceleration clause and
its final maturity date is ascertainable from the record of the mort-
gage, the limitation statute of five years begins to run from the date
of the prescribed final payment and not from the date of an earlier
default in paying a monthly installment.06
K. Attorney's Fees
An attorney was given a note and mortgage as security for an
attorney's fee for $8,000 representing ten percent of the value of
property of the client. When the attorney then stated that the
property was worth $120,000 and received a note and mortgage for
$12,000 and the property was then sold for $80,000 pursuant to the
original sales contract, the additional $4,000 was unsupported by
consideration because the attorney in the $12,000 contract was al-
ready bound under the $8,000 contract. 07
Property was sold to a buyer under a contract which provided
that the buyer had the right to rescind the transaction within six
months after the closing, with the sales price to be refunded to the
buyer. To secure this contingent obligation the seller had a corpora-
tion give its note and mortgage to the buyer. The buyer subse-
quently foreclosed the mortgage when the seller was unable to re-
turn the purchase price. The corporate mortgagor was held liable for
103. Davanzo v. Resolute Ins. Co., 346 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
104. Corcoran v. Brody, 347 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
105. Sun First Nat'l Bank v. R.G.C., 348 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
106. Conner v. Coggins, 349 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).




attorney's fees as provided for by the mortgage.' ° On the other
hand, the individual seller whose sales and repurchase contract did
not provide for attorney's fees was not so liable.
The imposition of receiver's fees and fees for the receiver's at-
torney are of great importance to the mortgagor. When the receiver's
time logs and records are not made available to the mortgagor until
just prior to the hearing setting these fees, a trial court should grant
the mortgagor's motion for a continuance to enable it to contest the
amount of the award. 0 9
L. Legislation
Section 687.03(3) of the Florida Statutes (1975), which was
amended in 1976, was again amended in 1977 to define the concept
of spreading advance payments over the term of the loan in order
to avoid the taint of usury. The spreading shall be:" 0
calculated by first computing the advance or forbearance as a
percentage of the total stated amount of the loan. This percen-
tage shall then be divided by the number of years, and fractions
thereof, of the loan according to its stated maturity date, without
regard to early maturity in the event of default. The resulting
annual percentage rate shall then be added to the stated annual
percentage rate of interest to produce the effective rate of interest
for purposes of this chapter.
An "Interest Rate Parity" statute was adopted which permits
various specified lenders licensed under Florida law or licensed or
chartered under federal law "to charge interest on loans or exten-
sions of credit to any person . . . or any firm or corporation, at the
maximum rate of interest permitted by law to be charged on similar
loans or extensions of credit made by any lender or creditor in the
State of Florida . . . ."I This act does not, however, permit a
lender to make loans that he is not otherwise permitted to make;
this act simply attempts to allow all lenders who are authorized to
make the same types of loans to charge the same interest rates. The
act increases the number of competing lenders, but makes certain
that the legal rate of interest of ten percent per annum will be used
in fewer and fewer loans.
The Mortgage Brokerage Act was extensively amended. Among
other things, a Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund was created to
108. Meyerson v. Cohen, 348 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
109. 955 N.E. 125th St. Corp. v. County Nat'l Bank, 349 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
110. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-374 (amending FLA. STAT. § 687.03(3) (1975)).
111. Id. ch. 77-391 (creating FLA. STAT. § 687.12 (1977)).
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be funded from license fees for mortgage brokers. This fund is de-
signed to compensate any person who has been adjudged by a court
to have suffered monetary damages as the result of a violation of the
act, e.g., the making of false promises by a mortgage broker, mis-
representation, failure to disburse, failure to account, failure to
deposit in escrow, etc. Inasmuch as the fund is to have a ceiling of
$750,000, it is problematical whether it will be of much protection
in the event of large defalcations. 12
VI. BANKS AND SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
A. Suits Against Banks
The federal statute, which prohibits an "attachment, injunc-
tion, or execution" from being issued against a national bank by a
state court prior to final judgment,"' has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court of the United States as not prohibiting a mortgagor-
debtor of a national bank from seeking a preliminary injunction in
a state court to enjoin the bank from allegedly wrongfully foreclos-
ing its mortgage."'
Constructive service of process upon a foreign national bank
under section 48.181(1) of the Florida Statutes (1975) cannot be
made when the complaint does not allege that the cause of action
arose in Florida, or that it arose from a business or business venture
of the bank in Florida."
5
A federal statute provides that venue of an action against a
national bank must be in the state and county in which the bank is
located, unless the bank has waived it."' The mere fact that a na-
tional bank located in Illinois has entered into a contract in Florida
is not to be construed as a waiver of its right to be sued in Illinois." 7
In agreeing with the Third District, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida (in a four to three decision) has held that the repossession of a
car in Duval County by a national bank does not constitute a waiver
of its venue privilege of asserting that any suit brought against it
for wrongful repossession must be filed in Broward County, wherein
it was located. The dissenting justices were of the view that when a
national bank commits a tortious act in another county it "locates"
112. Id. ch. 77-397 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 494.01-.11 (1975)).
113. National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 91 (1970).
114. Third Nat'l Bank v. IMPAC, Inc., 432 U.S. 312 (1977).
115. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Banco del Atlantico, 343 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
116. National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1970).




itself in that county, and this constitutes a waiver of its venue
privilege in regards to suit on that tortious act."'
B. Governmental Controls
Section 658.10(1) of the Florida Statutes (1975) provides that
all bank reports, information, etc., submitted to the Comptroller are
to be deemed confidential communications and shall not be made
public "unless with the consent of the department." The Supreme
Court of Florida held that the above quoted words constituted an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Comptrol-
ler."' The court subsequently enjoined him from releasing to the
press the names and stock holdings of the stockholders of certain
banks.
Under section 120.57 of the Florida Statutes (1975), a bank
which is protesting the award of a branch charter to another bank
is entitled to a hearing in order to present its protests because it is
a "party" under Florida Administrative Code Rules 3-2.20, 3-2.26
and 3-3.73. The bank is also entitled to judicial review of the De-
partment's action under section 120.68 of the Florida Statutes
(1975).11"
The Administrative Procedure Act'' requires the Department
of Banking and Finance, Division of Banking, to follow the findings
of its hearings officers in applications for bank charters "unless the
findings of fact were not based upon competent substantial evi-
dence." The relevant statute provides that an appellate court may
not substitute its judgment for that of the appropriate agency.'2 If
the Department of Banking and Finance should refuse to follow the
findings of its hearing officer, which of these two conflicting rules
should guide the appellate court? In a case of first impression in-
volving the denial of a bank charter by the Department despite the
favorable findings by its hearing officer, the District Court of Ap-
peal, First District, in a very scholarly opinion, held that in light of
the view expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States, 2
3
the appellate court should give weight to the findings of the hearing
officer (which were discarded by the Department) in determining
118. Landmark Bank v. Giroux, 358 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1978), rev'g, 345 So. 2d 847 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1977).
119. Lewis v. Bank of Paco County, 346 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1977).
120. Gadsden State Bank v. Lewis, 348 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977); Jefferson Nat'l
Bank v. Lewis, 348 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977); Central Bank v. Lewis, 348 So. 2d 348
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
121. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)9 (1977).
122. Id. § 120.68(10) (1977).
123. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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whether substantial evidence supported the Department's findings.
Furthermore, the Department's final order must clearly support the
basis of its decision and follow the criteria articulated in section
659.03(1) of the Florida Statutes (1975).'
C. Bank Collection Problems
A complaint which alleged that a depositary bank transferred
a checking account of a corporation to another bank in North Caro-
lina pursuant to a fraudulent telephone request which was honored
without the signature of authorized persons of the corporation, with
the result that the telephoning individual absconded with the funds,
is sufficient to allege a cause of action under section 3-404 of the
UCC.'1 This section states that an unauthorized signature is wholly
inoperative.
Under section 4-302 of the UCC, a drawee-payor bank which
fails to dishonor by its midnight deadline (midnight of the banking
day following the banking day of receipt) becomes liable for the face
amount of the check even though the account of its customer is
insufficient to cover the check. Normally, in order to trigger this
liability, presentment has to be made to the drawee-payor bank
itself. If, however, the drawee-payor bank has contracted with an-
other bank for data processing services and has designated this bank
as the place for presentment of checks drawn on the drawee-payor
bank, then the time for honor or dishonor begins to run from the
time these checks are presented for payment (through a clearing-
house) to the data processing bank rather than when the checks
actually reach the drawee-payor bank. As a result, the attempt by
the drawee-payor bank to dishonor at a point later than the mid-
night deadline after its data processing bank had received the check
was ineffective.' The check had been paid under Section 4-
213(1)(d) of the UCC, and the depositary bank was not liable to the
data processing bank.
The fact that a drawee bank dishonors a check of its drawer
customer which was payable to another bank because of inside in-
formation as to the cash-flow problems of the drawer corporation
does not constitute a fraud upon the payee bank. Thus, the drawee
bank is not liable under section 3-409(1) of the UCC. 27
124. McDonald v. Department of Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1.977).
125. David Miller Dist. Co. v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 342 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
126. Capital City First Nat'l Bank v. Lewis State Bank, 341 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1977).




Sections 77.031, 77.04, 77.06, and 77.07 of the Florida Statutes
(1975) which permit prejudgment garnishment have been held un-
constitutional by the Supreme Court of Florida in that they permit
a taking of property without due process of law. The court found the
sections infirm in that: (1) they allow the writ to issue without
judicial supervision; (2) they do not require a sworn-to complaint
by the plaintiff and he need not allege any facts justifying the gar-
nishment; and (3) they do not require an immediate post-seizure
hearing but merely keep the courts open to hear dissolution mo-
tions. 1
8
Section 222.11 of the Florida Statutes (1975) prohibits the gar-
nishment of salary and wages payable to the head of a household.
However, when the head of the household receives the wages and
deposits them in a bank account, this account may be garnished
because it is no longer due him for personal services but it is payable
to him by his bank.'
2
In a case of first impression, it was held that the State of Flor-
ida, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, may not be gar-
nished as the debtor of a judgment debt.'30
An order which commands the county to distrain funds owed
to a building contractor is the equivalent of garnishment proceed-
ings. '
31
A federal statute32 which permits the garnishment (in child
support and alimony matters) of the United States Government for
money due to employees (including servicemen) as compensation is
not inconsistent with sections 222.11 and 222.12 of the Florida Stat-
utes (1975). Another section (section 61.12 of the Florida Statutes
(1975)) also permits the garnishment of the state for wages due to
"any person or public officer, state or county, whether the head of
a family residing in this state or not" to enforce court orders for
alimony, suit money or child support. Although section 61.12 does
not mention the word "judgment" and even though the word'
"decree" was previously deleted from the statute, with only the
word "orders" being left in the section, it was further held that the
section was to be construed as permitting a writ of garnishment to
be entered on a judgment of a Florida court which established a
foreign alimony judgment in Florida.'
128. Ray Lein Constr., Inc. v. Wainwright, 346 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1977).
129. Hertz v. Fisher, 339 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
130. State v. Gordon Bros. Concrete, 339 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
131. Wesley Constr. Co. v. Biscayne Constr., Inc., 341 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1970).
133. Hall v. Air Force Fin. Center, 344 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
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In a case of first impression in Florida, a promissory note which
was given to a bank provided that the bank-holder had the right of
offset against the maker as to any deposit account and that the
offset could be exercised after default without notice or other for-
mality. The court held that the bank could exercise its offset rights
against the debtor's account after it had been garnished by a judg-
ment lien creditor even though the note was not in default as to
monthly payments. The note was, however, in default because the
maker did not maintain insurance coverage and had sold some of
the collateral (equipment) without permission. The note did not
contain an acceleration clause, but the court seemed to use the
offset clause as a kind of a quasi-acceleration clause.'34
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, has expressed
doubt that a trial court has the power in a suit by a garnisher against
a mortgagor of his judgment debtors to order the mortgage satisfied
upon payment of the mortgage when the action did not include the
judgment debtors as parties. The appellate court, however, affirmed
the actions of the trial court on the basis that a court of equity could
protect the mortgagors from any possibility of being held liable to
the judgment debtors on the mortgage.'
A garnishee bank which was garnished for a judgment of $2,780
when there was only $28.77 in the judgment debtor's account was
awarded attorney's fees of $60.00, over the protests of the creditor
that the amount was excessive. 3'
E. Garnishment Legislation
Garnishment of a wage earner's salary for child support may
now be made on a "continuing basis for so long as the court may
determine or until otherwise ordered by the court or a court of
competent jurisdiction in a further proceeding.'
' 37
F. Banking Legislation
Banks incorporated in foreign countries are now permitted to
open one banking facility in Florida in order to transact only such
limited business in this state as is clearly related to and is usual in
international or foreign business and in financing international
commerce. No foreign bank may exercise fiduciary powers or receive
deposits except for credit balances necessarily incidental to or aris-
134. Barsco, Inc. v. H.W.W., Inc., 346 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
135. Bowling v. Rocket Wheels Indus., Inc., 344 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
136. Shult Homes Corp. v. Maurice, 348 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 1977).
137. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-26, § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. § 61.12 (1975)).
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ing out of the exercise of its lawful powers. Newly enacted section
659.67 of the Florida Statutes (1977) states that foreign banks must
comply with most of the Florida Banking Code and must submit to
the supervision and control of the Florida Department of Banking
and Finance.
131
Section 658.10 of the Florida Statutes (1975), relating to bank
reports to the Department of Banking and Finance, was amended
to provide for more disclosure of records which were previously con-
sidered confidential. At the same time, the amendment also at-
tempts to protect the privacy of banks, individual stockholders,
officers, etc. The Department was given the unenviable authority to
draft rules balancing the public's right to know against the banks'
and individuals' rights of privacy. 9
For the purpose of establishing "common trust funds," a bank
or trust company is now defined as including two or more banks or
trust companies which are members of the same affiliated group as
defined in section 1504 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.140
Credit unions may now make loans secured by second as well
as first mortgages on real property.' 4'
Section 659.292 of the Florida Statutes (1975) has been created
to permit the use of "convenience accounts" in banks. A
''convenience account" is a demand deposit account in the name of
one individual (a principal) in which one or more other individuals
have been designated as agents with the right only to withdraw
funds from or draw checks on such account. Any balance in the
convenience account will be paid to the principal's guardian in the
event of his incompetency or to any person designated by court
order in the event of the principal's death, including his personal
representative. The bank which holds such an account is protected
from claims as long as it makes payments in accordance with this
section. In addition, the bank has the right of offset against this
convenience account in the event the principal owes money to the
bank. 142Section 665.381 of the Florida Statutes (1975) was amended to
provide that savings and loan associations, in making improvement
loans to home owners and mobile home owners, shall not charge
more than fourteen percent simple interest per annum, and said
138. Id. ch. 77-157 (creating FLA. STAT. § 659.67 (1977) & adding subsections (3)(i) & (5)
to FLA. STAT. § 658.08 (Supp. 1976)).
139. Id. ch. 77-94 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 119.07(2)(b), 658.10 & 659.25 (1975)).
140. Id. ch. 77-42 (amending FLA. STAT. § 660.11 (1975)).
141. Id. ch. 77-151 (amending FLA. STAT. § 657.16 (1975)).
142. Id. ch. 77-160.
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interest may not be precomputed. The act affects only those loans
made after its effective date, July 1, 1977.
Section 532.04 of the Florida Statutes was created to authorize
the payor of wages to deposit them directly to the account of the
payee-employee in a financial institution by electronic or other
medium with the written consent of the employee.
14
Any banking drive-in and walkup facility which is being oper-
ated on June 27, 1977, is now to be deemed a branch bank, but it
shall not be counted as one of the two branches authorized by sec-
tion 659.06(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes (1975). 111
Section 659.06 was simplified by eliminating the requirement
that the Department of Banking had to consider any bank applica-
tion when a competitor filed a branch application.' Subsection (2)
of the same section was amended by the addition of language which
provides for facilities of branch banks.
4 7
Section 516.11 of the Florida Statutes (1975) has been amended
so that the Department of Banking and Finance is only required to




The Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, 4' which pro-
hibits certain debtor harassment practices and which gives a rem-
edy for violations, has been construed as creating a cause of action
for the invasion of privacy. Thus, an insurance company, which
provides insurance coverage for a collection agency when it is sued
for violation of any person's right of privacy, is obligated to furnish
coverage when the collection agency is sued under these sections of
the statutes. 0
Section 559.72(7) of the Florida Statutes (1975) provides that
in collecting consumer claims no person shall "willfully communi-
cate with the debtor or any member of his family with such fre-
quency as can reasonably be expected to harass the debtor or his
143. Id. ch. 77-179 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 665.381(4)-(5) (1975)).
144. Id. ch. 77-296.
145. Id. ch. 77-376 (repealing FLA. STAT. § 659.06(2)(b) (Supp. 1976)).
146. Id. ch. 77-389. ,
147. Id. ch. 77-383 (amending FLA. STAT. § 659.06(2)(a) (Supp. 1976)).
148. Id. ch. 77-356 (previously, the Department of Banking and Finance was required to
make semi-annual inspections).
149. FLA. STAT. §§ 559.72-.77 (1977).




family." In a case of first impression in Florida, 5' it was held that
both the frequency and purpose of the creditor's telephone calls
must be considered by the trier of fact. Proof of numerous calls is
not sufficient if the calls were made merely to remind the debtor,
to determine his reasons for non-payment, to negotiate differences,
or to persuade him to pay. If, however, the calls continue after the
debtor has fully communicated the above facts to the lender, then
they would constitute a violation of the statute. For example, a
question for the jury would be present when the lender telephoned
the debtor more than 10,0 times within a five month period after the
debtor told the lender to stop calling and sue him for payment. If
the calls were without invective, made within normal business
hours, and the lender did have cause, then an award of punitive
damages should not be made.
The Act has been held to apply to a lender who was an individ-
ual making a noninterest-bearing loan to a friend. Furthermore,
when the lender informed an intimate friend of the debtor about the
loan, this communication was not privileged under the wording that
a lender shall not "disclose to a person other than the debtor or his
family"'' 2 information about the loan, because this intimate friend
was not living with the debtor as a member of her family. Finally,
when the debtor filed a counterclaim for violation of this statute
(when the lender filed suit to collect the loan) based upon the
lender's single communication to the intimate friend of the debtor,
this counterclaim was found not to be "ill-founded or brought for
purposes of harassment.' 5 3 As a result, the trial court would not be
justified in awarding attorney's fees against the debtor because of
her counterclaim. The subject matter of the counterclaim was a
matter of first impression in Florida, and her cause of action was
proved with the exception that she was unable to demonstrate that
her reputation was damaged as a result of the unprivileged commu-
nication.
A complaint which alleges the mailing of a letter in a window
envelope which permits the word "debtor" to appear directly above
the plaintiff's name and address and which was allegedly done to
embarrass the debtor states a cause of action, provided that the
complaint further alleges that the sender of the letter was engaged
in collecting consumer claims. In the absence of this latter allega-
tion, no cause of action is stated."'
151. Stry v. J.M. Fields, Inc., 343 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
152. FLA. STAT. § 595.72(5) (1977).
153. Heard v. Mathis, 344 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
154. Hansen v. Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 348 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
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In a case of first impression in Florida, it was decided that the
lender in a home improvement transaction which is covered by the
Truth in Lending Act must, under section 1635(a) of Title 15 of the
United States Code, inform both the husband and the wife of their
right to rescind the transaction within three days when both parties
encumber jointly owned real property. Notice to one spouse is not
sufficient to prevent the other from exercising his or her right to
rescind. 55
B. Legislation
Sellers of goods to retail consumers who ship or deliver the
goods in sealed boxes which hide the goods from view and who also
require their buyers to sign a certificate of satisfaction as a condition
for delivery are now required to add the following legend on the
certificate:
BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL
If the goods you have received are not in satisfactory condition
or operation, you may cancel this statement of satisfaction by
mailing a notice to the seller. This notice must indicate that you
do not want the goods in the condition in which they were deliv-
ered and must be postmarked before midnight of the fifth busi-
ness day after you sign this statement.
Certificates of satisfaction which do not comply with this wording
shall be null and void.
156
Under an amendment to section 516.18(3) of the Florida Stat-
utes (1975) (The Florida Consumer Finance Act), loans made to
nonresident consumers in foreign states at an interest rate in excess
of that permitted in Florida, may be enforced in Florida "where that
state has in effect a regulatory small loan or consumer finance law
similar in principle to this act."' 57
Sections 520.07(4) and 520.34(7) of the Florida Statutes (1975)
were altered to provide that, at the holder's option, unearned fi-
nance charges resulting from the cancellation of any insurance pol-
icy insuring automobiles and goods bought on credit will either be
credited to the final maturing installments of the contract or paid
to the buyer of the goods. 5'
The credit life insurance laws were changed to state that the
amount of credit life insurance on the life of the debtor shall not
155. Yslas v. D.K. Guenther Builders, 343 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
156. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-346 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 501.141 (1977)).
157. Id. ch. 77-256 (amending FLA. STAT. § 516.18(3) (1975)).
158. Id. ch. 77-245 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 520.07(4) & 520.34(7) (1975)).
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exceed $20,000 "except that loans not exceeding 1 year's duration
shall not be subject to such limits and on such loans not exceeding
1 year's duration, the limits of coverage shall not exceed $20,000
with any one insurer."'' 9
Universities in the state university system are now authorized
to accept credit card payments as compensation for goods and serv-
ices which might be in competition with private business.'6 0
The relatively recent practice of some real estate brokers to
issue warranties covering the structural components of used homes
for a period of usually one year has now come within the licensing
requirements of the Florida Department of Insurance under statu-
tory procedures designed to facilitate the continued solvency of
"home warranty associations."' 6'
Under the general provisions of the Florida Consumer Protec-
tion Statutes,'6 2 home solicitation sales now include those made by
telephone.' 3 The buyer has three business days (not the former
calendar days) in which to cancel a home solicitation sale.'64 Fur-
thermore, all businesses conducting home solicitation sales are now
required to furnish identification, name, address, telephone num-
ber, etc., to the prospective buyer.'65 The Division of Consumer
Services of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services
is empowered to investigate complaints, and it may institute pro-
ceedings to enjoin any violator.' 6 In practice, however, the injunc-
tive process comes too late in most cash Sales to home solicitation
victims.
A federal "Fair Debt Collection Practices Act"'67 has been en-
acted to prevent the harassment of consumer debtors by "debt-
collectors" whose principal purpose is the collection of debts or who
regularly collect or attempt to collect consumer debts owed to oth-
ers.' 8 The debt collector may not (1) communicate with the debtor,
without his consent, at any unusual times or places; (2) communi-
cate with third parties (except as provided by the Act) regarding the
debt;' 9 (3) harass the debtor by threats of violence or obscenity; (4)
159. Id. ch. 77-246 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 627.553(3) & 627.679(2) (1975)).
160. Id. ch. 77-298 (amending FLA. STAT. § 239.665 (1975)).
161. Id. ch. 77-339 (codified at FLA. STAT §§ 634.301-.328 (1977)).
162. FLA. STAT. §§ 501.011-.135 (1977).
163. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-350 (amending FLA. STAT. § 501.021(2).(1975)).
164. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 501.021(3) (1975)).
165. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 501.046 (1977)).
166. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 501.052 (1977)).
167. Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (amending the Consumer Credit Protection
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 160 et seq. (1970)).
168. Id. § 803(6).
169. Id. § 805(2)(1).
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publish debtor lists; or (5) make repeated telephone calls to har-
ass.'70 Lawyers are expressly excluded from the definition of "debt
collector."' 7 ' A debt collector who is found guilty in a civil action for
a violation of the Act can be forced to pay actual damages and either
"additional damages" (a euphemism for punitive damages) as al-
lowed by the court or reasonable attorney's fees and court costs.,
If the consumer action is brought in bad faith to harass the debt
collector, reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded to the debt
collector. "3 In class actions by consumers against a debt collector,
"additional damages" are limited to either $500,000 or one percent
of the net worth of the debt collector, whichever is less.'74 Any incon-
sistent state statutes which govern debt collection activities will be
annulled or altered by this Act. If any state statute, however, has
greater consumer protection than the federal act, the state statute
will not be affected. As a result, Florida case law which has included
persons collecting their own debts within the ambit of the Florida
Act will continue to be viable.
VIII. SECURITY INTERESTS
A. Perfection and Priorities of Security Interests
Although Article 9 does not apply to a lien on real estate, it does
apply to a case wherein a developer of land enters into installment
contracts for the sale of the land and gives a lender a security inter-
est in these installment land contracts. This result is unaffected
even though the loan is also secured by a mortgage on the realty
given by the developer to the lender. If the perfection of the security
interest is made within four months of the bankruptcy of the devel-
oper, it may be set aside as a voidable preference.' 5
B. Repossessions and Collections
The Supreme Court of Florida held that section 78.065(2) of the
Florida Statutes (1975), which deals with the procedure in replevin
actions, is not specifically contrary to Rules 1.140 and 1.500 of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, Rule 1.010, which pro-
vides that the procedure in replevin shall be set by statute unless
170. Id. § 805(b).
171. Id. § 806.
172. Id. § 803(6)(F).
173. Id. § 813(a).
174. Id. § 816.




the Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provide to the contrary,
along with the other statutory rules, is constitutional.' 6
C. Notice of Sale of Repossessed Goods
A district court held that an informal telephone conversation
between the repossessing creditor and the debtor, which indicated
that the creditor was "going to have to sell"' 77 the goods, was suffi-
cient notice of sale where the debtor tried to find a buyer for the
goods, the debtor knew that the creditor's business included the sale
of used goods, and the goods were sold in the normal course of
business within three months of the telephone conversation.
Whether the court would have upheld the notion of oral notice in
the absence of the above facts is uncertain.
Guarantors of a promissory note and a security agreement are
to be deemed "debtors" under Section 9-105 of the UCC and are
entitled to notice of sale of repossessed goods under section 9-504
and 9-506. This right to notice cannot be waived in advance of
default under section 9-501(3) even though under the guaranty
agreement the guarantors expressly waived notice of disposition of
the collateral. Consequently, the guarantors will not be liable for a
deficiency judgment in favor of the creditor if they never received
notice of the sale. 78
In First National Bank v. State ex rel. Department of
Insurance,'79 bonds and stock were delivered as security to a bank
by an insurance company on July 5, 1974. However, the bank did
not bind itself to lend any money until July 19, 1974, when the
insurance firm gave its collateral note to the bank. The bank subse-
quently disbursed the first funds of the loan on July 22, 1974. The
insurance firm was placed in receivership on January 16, 1975. The
court held that the date of "transfer" of the stock (under section
631.262(2) of the Florida Statutes) was on July 19, 1974, which was
within six months of the receivership and constituted a voidable
preference under section 631.262(1) of the Florida Statutes (1975).
The court noted that under section 9-303 of the UCC a security
interest cannot be perfected until it has attached, and it cannot
attach until value is given under section 9-204. Inasmuch as the
bank did not give a binding promise to lend (value) until July 19,
1974, the security interest attached and became perfected as of that
date which was within six months of the date of receivership.
176. Gonzalez v. Babcock's Home Furnish Cent., 343 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1977).
177. Bondurant v. Beard Equip. Co., 345 So. 2d 806, 807 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
178. Barnett v. Barnett Bank, 345 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
179. 350 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
19781
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
D. Legislation
Section 534.49 of the Florida Statutes (1975) was amended to
provide that when livestock are sold at a livestock market and live-
stock drafts are given as payment, the drafts shall not be considered
as an extension of credit and "shall not defeat the creation of a lien
on such animal and its carcass and all products therefrom and pro-
ceeds thereof, to secure all or a part of its sale price . . . . ' It is
also unlawful for the buyer to delay payment of the draft upon its
presentment at "the payor's bank."'' The quoted words may cause
confusion in light of section 3-120 and 4-105 of the UCC.52 Further-
more, it should be noted that any lien under this section would be
subservient to a prior perfected security interest in the livestock
buyer's inventory and after acquired property under the traditional
view. 8 3 However, if the maverick decision in International Har-
vester Credit Corp. v. American National Bank of Jacksonville"4 is
adhered to, the statutory lien would probably take priority.
180. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-362, § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. § 543.49 (1975)).
181. Id. § 2 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 534.501 (1977)).
182. U.C.C. § 3-120 provides: "An instrument which states that it is 'payable through'
a bank or the like designates that bank as a collecting bank to make presentment but does
not of itself authorize the bank to pay the instrument." Id. § 4-105(2) defines "Payor Bank"
as "a bank by which an item is payable as drawn or accepted."
183. E.g., In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976).
184. 296 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1974).
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